Thursday, September 30, 2021

Informal Notes on Habitual Residence in U.S. Courts in Hague Abduction Convention Cases

by Jeremy D. Morley

I had the pleasure this week of participating in a panel discussion organized by the Singapore Bar Association with three brilliant international family lawyers, Yap Teong Liang of Singapore, Kiran Dhaliwal of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Keturah Sageman of Sydney, Australia. The topic was Relocation v Abduction – Fight or Flight: Is Abduction a Hindrance to Return? We used a case study primarily drafted by T.L. Yap. 

Here are some of my extremely informal notes on the issue of habitual residence in a U.S. Hague Abduction Convention case. For more on the topic see my book.

If the habitual residence issue were heard in a U.S. court the outcome would definitely be uncertain. Last year, the U.S. adopted a new test of habitual residence in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Monasky case. The good news is that the test has now been clearly and simply stated. The bad news is that the test has now been clearly and simply stated. The test is simply that of the “totality of the circumstances,” but no one really knows what that means, since it is almost completely fact-based.

What is clear is that the old rule adopted by several U.S. circuits, of a primary focus on the last shared intention of the parents, has mostly been abandoned and that it has been replaced by looking far more at the situation through the eyes of the child. Where did the child think was her “home”?

In the case in the excellent case study, we were given some of the relevant circumstances, but we would need many more details in order to be able to make a prediction as to how a U.S. court would rule.

In support of Australia being the habitual residence is the child’s one-half year in Sydney plus her attending school in Sydney during that time. In support of the habitual residence still being in the U.S. is that she lived there for the first 8 years of her life, her father kept the family apartment in New York and the family retained Sophia’s school place in New York and that the parties’ original intention was to return to New York. The parents’ citizenships cancel each other out and in any event are probably not significant to a 9-year-old child. Among the facts that we still need to know are the following:

·       Where are Sophia's friends?

·       Is Sophia close to family in Sydney or more with family in New York?

·       Where is their family’s “stuff”? Where is Sophia’s stuff in particular?

·       Did they buy new furniture in Sydney? Did they buy cheap furniture from IKEA or expensive designer furniture from a high-end store?

·       Has Sophia settled well into school in Sydney or was she doing better in school in New York?

·       And with respect to the parents’ agreement to return to New York if things didn’t work out in Australia, was a return to New York implicitly contingent on Sergio's good behavior? Was there an implied term that he would do better and that he would work on repairing the relationships? Since he is the one who apparently sabotaged the agreement by hitting Sophia, isn’t it wrong to reward him for his own misconduct?

I should note that, unlike the affidavit-based focus in Singapore, the presentation concerning these issues in U.S. courts will primarily by means of witness testimony, which may include intense cross-examination. In addition, even in an expedited Hague case, pre-trial discovery is often ordered, and this may include pre-trial depositions as well as extensive document production.

My final point on habitual residence is that the Supreme Court ruled in Monasky that these issues are to be decided by the trial court and should not normally be reviewed on appeal because they are so intensely fact-based, which is the province of a trial court, not an appeal court.

 


Wednesday, September 22, 2021

Date of Wrongful Abduction Governs Hague Convention Habitual Residence Determinations

 

by Jeremy D. Morley

In any Hague Abduction Convention case, the court must determine the date of the alleged wrongful removal or retention of the child before determining the child's habitual residence. A decision on the applicable date may well resolve the entire case.

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit in Douglas v. Douglas (6th Cir.9/21/21, Case No. 21-2335), in which I had an advisory role, affirmed an award of summary judgment dismissing a Hague petition on the ground that the child was habitually resident in the United States, rather than Australia, where she was born and lived for four months until her mother took her to Michigan, to live there permanently (mother’s claim) or for a mere visit (father’s claim).

It is most unusual to succeed on a motion for summary judgment in a case about habitual residence, because the Supreme Court’s test of “totality of the circumstances,” established in Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020), is factual and open-ended. See: Jeremy D. Morley, The Hague Abduction Convention: Practical Issues and Procedures (3d ed).


But here the petitioner had alleged in his original petition that the wrongful retention had not occurred until 7½ months after the infant child was taken to Michigan. This allowed the trial judge to grant summary judgment in respondent’s favor, since the infant had consensually spent so much time in Michigan before the date of the alleged wrongful retention.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed that ruling, stating that, after 7½ months in Michigan (which followed only four months in Australia, during which the parents had separated and the mother had planned to return to the United States), the child was “at home” in Michigan on the relevant date.

Critically, although the petitioner had sought to amend his pleadings to allege that an earlier wrongful retention date should be used, that application had been denied, and that determination had not been appealed.

Wednesday, September 15, 2021

U.S. Diplomatic Protest – Ecuador & International Child Abduction

 

Jeremy D. Morley

In May 2021, the U.S. Embassy in Quito, Ecuador delivered a formal diplomatic protest known as a “demarche” to members of President-elect Guillermo Lasso’s transition team. The Department noted that Ecuador has been cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2021 Annual Report on International Child Abduction during 2020, specifically for judicial delays.


Specifically, the State Department has determined that the Ecuadorian judicial authorities failed to regularly implement and comply with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

As a result of this failure, 17 percent of requests for the return of abducted children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. On average, these cases were unresolved for one year and three months.

Ecuador was previously cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2015-2020 Annual Reports.

 

Monday, September 13, 2021

U.S. Diplomatic Protest – Costa Rica & International Child Abduction


Jeremy D. Morley

In May 2021, U.S. Embassy San Jose delivered a formal diplomatic protest known as a “demarche” to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica concerning Costa Rica’s citation for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2021 Annual Report on International Child Abduction for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance during 2020.


Department officials raised continuing concerns with the Government of Costa Rica about the Costa Rican judiciary’s persistent failure to regularly implement and comply with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

Specifically, the Department raised concerns with delays in the judicial process and Costa Rica’s compliance with the Convention.

 

 

Tuesday, September 07, 2021

U.S. Diplomatic Protest - Brazil & International Child Abduction

 

 Jeremy D. Morley


In June 2021, the Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Brasilia delivered a formal diplomatic protest known as a “demarche” to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notifying Brazilian officials that the Department again cited Brazil in the 2021 Annual Report on International Child Abduction for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance during 2020.


The demarche expressed concern about Brazil's continued failure to comply with its obligations under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.


In particular, the demarche noted U.S. concerns with excessive delays within Brazil's judiciary and language in more than one judicial decision that was clearly noncompliant with the Convention.


The State Department has reported that the Brazilian judicial authorities failed to regularly implement and comply with the provisions of the Convention and failed to take appropriate steps to locate children in an abduction case, contributing to Brazil's persistent failure to implement and abide by the provisions of the Convention.


As a result of these persistent failures, 75 percent of requests for the return of abducted children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. On average, these cases were unresolved for three years and eight months.


Brazil was previously cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2006-2020 Annual Reports.

 

 

Friday, September 03, 2021

HOW TO WIN A HAGUE CONVENTION CHILD ABDUCTION CASE

 


by Jeremy D. Morley Author of The Hague Abduction Convention: Practical Issues and Procedures for Family Lawyers, published by the American Bar Association. Here are some tips for attorneys and clients faced with instituting or defending child abduction proceedings under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, whether in the United States or internationally.

Thursday, September 02, 2021

U.S. Diplomatic Protest - Argentina & International Child Abduction

 

Jeremy D. Morley

In June 2021, the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires delivered a formal diplomatic protest known as a “demarche” to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, notifying Argentine officials that the Department cited Argentina in the 2021 Annual Report on International Child Abduction for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance during 2020.


The demarche expressed concern about Argentina’s continued failure to comply with its obligations under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

In particular, the demarche noted U.S. concerns with excessive delays within Argentina’s legal system, which allows multiple appeals both on the merits of the decision and on the manner in which decisions are enforced.

The State Department has reported that, in 2020, the Argentine judicial authorities failed to regularly implement and comply with the provisions of the Convention. As a result of this failure, 67 percent of requests for the return of abducted children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. On average, these cases were unresolved for six years. Argentina was previously cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2015-2020 Annual Reports.

Wednesday, September 01, 2021

BANGLADESH, THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION, AND AN ABDUCTION FROM JAPAN

 by attorney Jeremy D. Morley, www.international-divorce.com

A terrifically interesting issue is pending before the courts of Bangladesh. My client is a Japanese doctor in Tokyo. Her estranged husband abducted the children from Tokyo to Dhaka, Bangladesh. The Family Court in Tokyo has ordered their return, but the father has failed to comply with the order. The matter is now before the courts in Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh has not signed the Hague Abduction Convention. See e.g. this article.


In my opinion, at its core, the fundamental issue in the Bangladesh courts in is whether Bangladesh is a safe haven for international child abduction and, indeed, an international outlaw.


One theory that may be pursued is that, since more than 100 countries have adopted the Hague Convention and since the Hague Abduction Convention is the most important international treaty in all of family law (possibly subject to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989), the provisions of the Convention have become part of customary international law and should therefore be applied by the courts in Bangladesh.


This theory is consistent with the decision of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in 2017 in considering the relevance of the principle of non-refoulement in relation to a Rohingya refugee being held in detention long after completing a formal prison sentence. Although Bangladesh was not a party to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the Supreme Court determined that it was nevertheless applicable in Bangladesh since the treaty had “become a part of customary international law which is binding upon all the countries of the world, irrespective of whether a particular country has formally signed, acceded to or ratified the Convention or not.” Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) v Government of Bangladesh, Writ petition no. 10504 of 2016, Bangladesh: Supreme Court, 31 May 2017 www.refworld.org/cases,BAN_SC,5d7f623e4.html


There is a strong argument that the same position should be taken with respect to the fundamental principles of the Hague Abduction Convention that abducted children should normally be returned expeditiously to their habitual residence and that an international child abductor should not be rewarded by being able to transfer child custody jurisdiction to the courts in the country to which he has abducted a child.  


It remains to be seen whether the courts in Bangladesh will require the matter to proceed by means of a length plenary custody case, in violation of the Japanese courts’ jurisdiction and in violation of the Hague principles, or whether they will respect the comity of nations and return the abducted children forthwith to Japan.

 

Saturday, August 28, 2021

BANGLADESH: THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT OF 2018


by Jeremy D. Morley

 

The Dowry Prohibition Act of 2018 (the "Act") of Bangladesh prohibits the giving or receiving of a dowry.  The primary purpose of the Act is to end the custom whereby the bride’s family makes a financial payment to the groom’s family upon a marriage. The system is now seen to be a “social curse,” which frequently leads to disputes between the families and the harassment of innocent parties.


Section 3 of the Act criminalizes the act of directly or indirectly demanding a dowry, punishable by imprisonment of up to five years and/or a significant fine Section 4 of the Act makes it an offense to give or receive a dowry, or to abet such actions, which is likewise punishable by a fine or imprisonment. Section 2 provides that the parties who may be prosecuted for such actions may include the bride, the groom, their parents or legal guardians, “or any other person directly involved in the marriage” from the side of the bride or the groom.

The term “dowry” is defined as "money or any other asset" demanded by a party as the consideration for a marriage. However, it does not include a dower or mahr, in those cases in which the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies to the parties. Nor does it apply to wedding gifts.

Section 5 of the Act provides that any agreement for giving or taking of a dowry is void.

In an attempt to limit the number of false cases and harassment of an innocent party, Section 6 of the Act criminalizes filing a false complaint or causing a false complaint to be filed.

Finally, the offenses committed under the Act are “cognizable, non-bailable, and compoundable.” This means that, as a “cognizable” offense, the police may arrest the accused without a warrant; as a “non-bailable” offense an accused does not have an automatic right to be released on bail; and as a “compoundable” offense the parties are allowed to settle the issue outside of court.

It should also be noted that there are additional remedies available in Bangladesh for dowry-related violence, including the “Nari-O-Shishu-Nirjatan-Daman-Ain, 2000” law, which provides severe penalties for any dowry-related offense which causes hurt, grievous hurt or death, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which defines "domestic violence" as any conduct which harasses, harms, injures, or endangers an aggrieved person, including any act done with a purpose to coerce an aggrieved person to meet any unlawful demand for a dowry.

 

Wednesday, August 25, 2021

Fee Award in Hague Abduction Convention Case

by Jeremy D. Morley


It is gratifying that, in its award of legal fees to my client, whose child was successfully returned from New York to Spain pursuant to the Hague Abduction Convention, the U.S. district court’s calculation was based in part on my status as “one of the leading experts” on the Convention, who has lectured, written and testified as an expert on the Hague Convention and international family law. Grano v. Martin, 2021 WL 350016 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2021). 


The fee award was granted even though there was some evidence of abuse by the petitioner. The district court ruled that this case, which was almost entirely about psychological as opposed to physical abuse, and in which both sides were less than candid, did not rise to the level of those cases justifying complete denial of an award. Further, an award of at least some fees serves the statutory purpose of deterring future child abductions. 


The Second Circuit’s affirmance of the original return order (Grano v. Martin, 821 F. App'x 26 (2d Cir. 2020)) is an important application of the new U.S. interpretation of the key term of “habitual residence” that was established by the Supreme Court in Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 722 (2020).  


For a full discussion of the Monasky case, see Jeremy D. Morley, The Hague Abduction Convention: Practical issues and Procedures for Family Lawyers, (Third Edition, 2021, published by the American Bar Association), available here.

Tuesday, August 17, 2021

JAPANESE LAW ABOUT MARRIED NAMES

by Jeremy D Morley

 

Japanese law requires that married couples share the same surname, which can be that of either the husband or the wife. There appears to be no country other than Japan that requires married couples to adopt the same surname. The Supreme Court of Japan recently ruled that this requirement does not violate the Japanese Constitution.


Human Rights Watch has explained that, “The single-surname system is a legacy of Japan’s traditional patriarchal family system, which placed men at the top of the family hierarchy and viewed women as entering the man’s family upon marriage.” Although the post-World War II Constitution recognized equality between men and women, and abolished much of the traditional family system, the single-surname rule remained. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has repeatedly called on the Japanese government to repeal it.

Article 750 of Japan’s Civil Code provides that, “a husband and wife shall adopt the surname of the husband or wife in accordance with that which is decided at the time of marriage.” Likewise, while Japan’s Family Register Act allows divorced spouses to adopt separate surnames, it contains no such provision in case of a marriage. Accordingly, a Japanese couple must decide on their shared last name in order to have their marriage registration accepted.

In recent years, as the Japanese government has encouraged women to play a greater role in Japanese society, there has been a growing demand that married couples should not be required to share the same surname. In 96% of cases, wives take their husband's surname, and it is asserted that this result contravenes the equal rights of husband and wife guaranteed in Article 24 of the Japanese Constitution.

In 2015, the Supreme Court, in a split ten-to-five decision, ruled that the law was not unconstitutional. The basis of the ruling was that, "As a way to refer to families, the bedrock of society, it is logical to have one surname." Several justices suggested at that time that the Japanese Diet should consider amending the law, and the issue was considered, but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is sharply divided on this issue.

Somewhat surprisingly, the very same issue of the constitutionality of the surname law was heard again by the Supreme Court earlier this year, although the issues were framed a little differently. Even more surprising is that, although in June 2021 the Supreme Court again upheld the law, it did not simply repeat its prior ruling but it was split once again on the very issue that it had decided just a few years earlier. Some of the judges, albeit in the minority, endorsed the position that the Court had a broad right to make public policy decisions when deciding the constitutionality of Japanese statutes. It will be fascinating to see how that idea plays out in future cases.

It should also be noted that a slight liberalization about married names was put in place fairly recently. The maiden name of a Japanese national can now be placed in parenthetical form on a married persons Japanese passport, in addition to the married name.

Wednesday, July 14, 2021

Iran Child Abduction; Iran Child Custody; Expert Evidence

 Jeremy Morley

I was accepted yesterday by both sides in a case in North Carolina as an expert in international child custody law and international child abduction law, and the laws and procedures of the same, and as these matters apply to Iran.

I have previously provided expert evidence as to international child custody issues concerning Iran in cases in Australia, Canada and California.

Monday, July 12, 2021

Malaysian Family Law: Single Expert Appointment

 


The Family Court of Western Australia appointed Jeremy D Morley as a single expert to report on the law and legal process by which the Malaysian courts make arrangements following the breakdown of a marriage with respect to the custody and guardianship of children, financial support and maintenance for spouses and children, division and adjustment of property (including matters concerning foreign real estate) and the division and dissolution of marriage.


Monday, June 28, 2021

Hague Abduction Case Reliance on Morley Treatise

In a Hague Abduction Convention case in the United States District Court in Savannah, Georgia, the Court relied on the opinions that I expressed in the 2020 edition of my treatise on International Family Law Practice that (a) international travel authorizations should normally be afforded only limited significance as evidence of consent to indefinite relocation and (b) a relocation of a petitioning parent to a country other than the child's habitual residence does not prevent the return of that child to the petitioner at the petitioner's current place of residence. Rishmawy v. Vergara, 2021 WL 1760303 (S,D, Ga., May 4, 2021).

Saturday, June 12, 2021

Costa Rica: State Department's Annual Report on International Child Abduction, 2021

Country Summary: The Convention has been in force between the United States and Costa Rica since 2008. In 2020, Costa Rica continued to demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance. Specifically, the judicial authorities failed to regularly implement and comply with the provisions of the Convention. As a result of this failure, 29 percent of requests for the return of abducted children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. The Department is unaware of any judicially ordered returns of children to the United States in 2020. On average, these cases were unresolved for one year and nine months. Costa Rica was previously cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2011- 2016, and 2020 Annual Reports. 


Initial Inquiries: In 2020, the Department received two initial inquiries from parents regarding a possible abduction to Costa Rica for which no completed applications were submitted to the Department.

Significant developments: Costa Rica’s Supreme Court, with the support of the Department, successfully hosted a series of virtual seminars from November 2020 through February 2021 on Hague Abduction Convention best practices. The seminars brought together Costa Rican Supreme Court judges, Department representatives, as well as legal experts and judges from Costa Rica, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, Spain, Canada, and the United States. 

Central Authority: The U.S. and the Costa Rican Central Authorities have a productive relationship that facilitates the resolution of abduction cases under the Convention.

Voluntary Resolution: The Convention states that central authorities “shall take all appropriate measures to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues.” In 2020, one abduction case was resolved through voluntary means. 

Location: The competent authorities regularly took appropriate steps to locate children after a Convention application was filed. On average, it took less than one month to locate a child. As of December 31, 2020, there were no open cases where the Costa Rican authorities remained unable to locate a child. 

Judicial Authorities: There were significant delays by the Costa Rican judicial authorities in deciding Convention cases. As a result of these delays, cases may be pending with the judiciary for over one year, contributing to a pattern of noncompliance. Additionally, judicial authorities rendered one decision that was not compliant with the Convention. Another case remained unresolved for one year and three months. 

Enforcement: The United States is not aware of any abduction cases in which a judicial order relating to international parental child abduction needed to be enforced by the Costa Rican authorities. Department Recommendations: The Department will continue intense engagement with the Costa Rican authorities to address issues of concern.


Monday, May 31, 2021

The Hague Abduction Convention: Practical Issues and Procedures for Family Lawyers, Third Edition

By Jeremy D. Morley

In a practice that increasingly involves cross-border issues, a growing number of clients fear their children may be abducted, are concerned about overseas travel, or are considering international marriage or divorce. Written to help family lawyers best represent clients and their children, this updated edition explains all aspect of how the Hague Convention works in the United States.


Every family lawyer should understand the workings of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This updated third edition of The Hague Abduction Convention explains for family lawyers how this critical treaty works in the United States, both in theory and in practice. The renowned author, Jeremy D. Morley, has enormous experience counseling clients and fellow practitioners as to international family law matters globally, as well as lecturing on international child custody law to audiences around the world.

Click here for further details.

Wednesday, May 26, 2021

Enforcement of Child Custody Orders in Japan

 by Jeremy D Morley

 

An amendment to Japan's Civil Procedure Law enters into force on June 1, 2021, intended to promote enforcement of Japanese civil custody orders. Although the new law may be helpful it will provide no benefit to non-custodial parents seeking to enforce their visitation rights.


Japanese law continues to provide that only one parent may have custody after a divorce, even if it established that both parents are ideal care providers. There is mounting pressure in Japan to change the law but that has not yet occurred. Accordingly, the only right that a non-custodial may enjoy in Japan is visitation. Even here, however, the visitation rights of a non-custodial parent are generally limited in the extreme.

Traditionally, Japanese court orders in family matters have been entirely unenforceable. That has changed slightly in recent years. The new law is intended to assist in such enforcement. However, it will benefit only the custodial parent. It simply allows for “direct enforcement” of the custodial parent’s right to secure the return of a child who has been removed or retained from that parent’s custody. Since custody after a divorce is usually given to the parent who has previously had the child in his or her possession, the law will now enhance the parent’s ability to enforce sole custody rights.

It is unfortunate that the new legislation provides no assistance to the non-custodial parent’s rights of visitation.

Japanese courts generally limit visitation to a couple of hours once a month in the daytime, in the area where the child is living, unless the parties agree otherwise. To make matters even worse, custodial parents can usually rely successfully on a multiplicity of acceptable excuses for non-compliance with visitation orders. The only way to seek enforcement of these rights is to seek some kind of financial sanction, which is often described as equivalent to a parking ticket. There is no contempt of court for the violation of court orders concerning family law matters in Japan and the only available remedy is the limited financial claim, which is generally difficult to secure and ineffective.

At least the new law might make it a little more likely that custodial parents will agree to allow a little more visitation, since they will now have the availability of a potential remedy if the child is not returned. I have repeatedly explained that in Japan possession is 99% of the law and it may be that the new legislation may lead to a modest change in that regard.

Yesterday I testified on such issues as an expert witness in a case in California concerning a Japanese mother's application to relocate the children from California to Japan. It is most unfortunate that the relocation applications of Japanese parents who wish to move with their children back to Japan must normally be denied because of the failure of the Japanese courts to enforce the provisions of foreign custody orders concerning the sharing of custody between the parents and concerning the rights of a non-residential parents to have liberal access to their children in Japan and in the country where the non-residential parent is living.

Tuesday, May 25, 2021

Brazil: 2021 State Department's Annual Report on International Child Abduction

Country Summary: The Convention has been in force between the United States and Brazil since 2003. In 2020, Brazil continued to demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance. Specifically, the Brazilian judicial authorities failed to regularly implement and comply with the provisions of the Convention. Additionally, the competent authorities failed to take appropriate steps to locate a child in an abduction case, contributing to Brazil’s persistent failure to implement and abide by the provisions of the Convention. As a result of these persistent failures, 75 percent of requests for the return of abducted children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. On average, these cases were unresolved for three years and eight months. Brazil was previously cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2006-2020 Annual Reports. 


Initial Inquiries: In 2020, the Department received three initial inquiries from parents regarding possible abductions to Brazil for which no completed applications were submitted to the Department.


In a majority of cases open at the end of calendar year 2020 in which there are judicial delays, the Brazilian Central Authority reported that Brazil’s Federal Public Ministry (MPF) was involved at some point. In some instances, it appeared that MPF intervention impacted cases. In other instances, actions by the MPF appeared to lengthen judicial proceedings in Brazil. 

Central Authority: The U.S. and Brazilian Central Authorities have a strong and productive relationship.


Voluntary Resolution: The Convention states that central authorities “shall take all appropriate measures to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues.” In 2020, one abduction case was resolved through voluntary means before the case was filed with the Brazilian Central Authority, and the child returned to the United States. 

Brazil demonstrated a pattern of noncompliance with the Convention as a result of failure by the competent authorities to take appropriate steps to locate children after a Convention application was filed. As a result, there is one case (accounting for 11 percent of the unresolved cases) that has been pending for more than 12 months where law enforcement has failed to locate the children, leading to significant delays in initiating the legal proceedings. The average time to locate a child was 37 days.

 Judicial Authorities: There were serious delays by the Brazilian judicial authorities in deciding Convention cases. As a result of these delays, cases may be pending with the judiciary for over one year, contributing to a pattern of noncompliance. In 2020, the Department was again unaware of any Brazilian efforts to address judicial delays, despite repeated engagement during the year by the Ambassador, senior Mission personnel, and the Department with counterparts Brazil, continued 32 in the Brazilian government. This failure to improve Convention implementation continues in the form of delays at the first-instance, the appellate, and the enforcement stages. As a result, the Department remains deeply concerned with the Brazilian judiciary’s repeated failure to regularly implement and comply with the provisions of the Hague Abduction Convention. Moreover, the U.S. Central Authority is deeply concerned by language that was clearly non-compliant with the Convention in more than one judicial decision. In these decisions, the courts used inaccurate definitions for a defense to a return claim. 

Enforcement: While courts in Brazil ordered returns under the Convention, Brazilian authorities were not able to enforce these orders. In one notable case, after 11 years of litigation at all levels of the Brazilian judiciary, the Brazilian Central Authority reported that the Brazilian court still failed to enforce its own judiciary’s order for return. Moreover, judicial decisions in Convention cases in Brazil were generally not enforced by the judiciary, which contributed to a pattern of noncompliance. 

Access: In 2020, the U.S. Central Authority acted on a total of two open access cases under the Convention in Brazil. Both of these cases were opened prior to 2020. Both cases had been filed with the Brazilian Central Authority. By December 31, 2020, both of these cases had been resolved. Department 

Recommendations: The Department will continue intense engagement with Brazilian authorities to address issues of concern and will consider actions to prompt better Brazilian compliance with the Convention.

Sunday, May 23, 2021

UCCJEA in International Cases: Home State, Temporary Absence Overseas & Human Rights Issues.

by Jeremy D. Morley


Difficult issues arise under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act when children are taken overseas for visits and do not return. A recent New York case illustrates some of the issues.


In Kassim v. Al-Maliki, 2021 WL 1774145 (NY App. Div. 2d. Dept. May 5, 2021), the Appellate Division, Second Department reviewed a Family Court order dismissing a petition for habeas corpus and custody of children who were taken from New York City to Yemen in 2016 where they have since remained. The father claimed that he and his wife consensually relocated to Yemen with the children. The mother claimed that they went to Yemen for a visit and that after they arrived there the father confiscated her and the children’s passports. She further explained that it was only after she signed a divorce agreement under duress that she was given her own passport and that she had then returned alone to the United States. Once she was back in New York, she had commenced a case against the father for habeas corpus and child custody. 


The Family Court dismissed the case without a hearing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction since the children had long been in Yemen, and the mother appealed.


The appeal court overturned the dismissal of the case. It ruled that the trial court “erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the mother’s petition without conducting a hearing” as to the issue of whether New York or Yemen was the child’s home state, since “there are disputed issues of fact regarding the circumstances under which the parties moved from New York to Yemen.” 


In substantial part, the issue in the case concerns the provisions of section 102(7) of the UCCJEA that a “period of temporary absence” from a state counts as part of the required period six consecutive months of residency in the state before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. On this issue, see Jeremy D. Morley, International Family Law Practice, Sec. 7:6. (Westlaw INTFLP § 7:6).

Courts have developed three distinct tests to determine whether absences are temporary or permanent:

1. Duration. Some courts focus solely on the length of the absence, holding that the child's physical location must be the central issue. 

2. Intent. Some courts consider the intent of the parties, and specifically whether the parties intended to be away for a limited amount of time and which state they viewed as their place of permanent domicile. 

3. Totality of Circumstances. Finally, some courts require an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the absence, including the duration of the absence, whether the parties intended the absence to be permanent or temporary, and any additional relevant circumstances. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719 (2020), applying a totality of circumstances test to the interpretation of the key term of “habitual residence” in the Hague Abduction Convention, may well encourage the use of the same test for interpreting “temporary absence” in the UCCJEA. 


A separate issue, not addressed by the Appellate Division decision but likely to arise on the remand of the case to the Family Court, is whether the child custody law of Yemen falls within the scope of the “escape clause” contained in UCCJEA Section 105(c), as expanded in New York pursuant to Section 75- d (c) of the Domestic Relation law.


The UCCJEA Model Act provides (UCCJEA § 105(a)) that a court “shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying” the statute, but in Section 105(c) that this need not apply “if the child custody law of [the] foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.”  The language is extremely narrow. It extends only to a “child custody law” that “violates fundamental principles of human rights” and appears on its face to be limited to the law as written in a foreign statute. 


However, New York has expanded the scope of the escape clause significantly. The New York legislature added the words, “or as applied” to the provision, so that it reads, “(c) A court of this state need not apply this article if the child custody law of a foreign country as written or as applied violates fundamental principles of human rights.” (Domestic Relations Law, Sec. 75-d(c)). On these issues, see Jeremy D. Morley, International Family Law Practice. §§ 7:23 – 7:28 (Westlaw INTFLP § 7:23 et seq.).


This will presumably allow a court in New York to consider both Yemen’s laws concerning child custody as they are written in the Personal Status Law of Yemen, which contains arbitrary provisions based on age, gender and religion, and also how those laws are actually applied in practice. 

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Wednesday, May 19, 2021

Court Delays in Colombia

A factor to take into account, among very many others, when considering issues concerning the need to use the courts in Colombia to secure the return of children who have been abducted to that country, is the extreme delays that plague the judicial process there.

Indeed, according to the World Justice Project’s current Rule of Law Index, surveying 128 countries, Colombia ranks almost bottom, at 124th.

Likewise, the World Bank Group has determined that it takes an average of 1,288 days to enforce a contract in Colombia, as compared to 590 days in OECD countries, with an average legal fee and expense cost of 45.8% of the claim value in Colombia as compared to 21.5% in OECD countries.

Tuesday, May 18, 2021

HUNGARY VIOLATES THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION

 by Jeremy D. Morley

Hungary does not comply with its obligation under the Hague Abduction Convention to promptly return children who are wrongfully taken to Hungary or retained in Hungary.


The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe determined on December 3, 2020 that Hungary's failure to meet its obligations under the Convention was so serious that certain specific cases should be reviewed by the Ministers under a special “enhanced supervision” procedure that is reserved for extraordinary cases.


The European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) has reprimanded Hungary on several occasions for flagrant violations of the human rights of left-behind parents whose children have been abducted to Hungary and have never been returned to their prior habitual residence. The European Union's Ministers have now brought the issue to a level of greater seriousness.


It should be noted that in its 2021 Annual Report on International Child Abduction the U.S. State Department lists Hungary as being compliant with the Convention. This is highly misleading. The Department received no completed requests for assistance in 2020 or several prior years for abductions to Hungary.

Having worked on international child custody matters concerning Hungary for many years, and having presented expert evidence on such matters, it is apparent that the problems include the following:

- Hungarian courts frequently misinterpret the Hague Convention's terms, such as “habitual residence,” in favor of the taking parent.
- There is no effective procedure within Hungary to enforce court custody orders. Pursuant to the governing Hungarian legislation, the enforcement of final and effective judicial custody and visitation decisions is not within the competence of the court handling the Hague case. The body that is responsible for enforcement cases is the local “Custody Authority.” The Custody Authorities do not have sufficient coercive power and their procedure is slow and inefficient. As a result, even a favorable Hague decision is often completely futile because it is not enforced.
- It typically happens that if, as and when enforcement is finally employed, the taking parent cannot be found. The “bailiff” cannot issue a search warrant with criminal consequences but merely reports the matter to the police.
- The passage of time in such circumstances typically leads to the child becoming well integrated into the new environment, which helps to create new defenses for the taking parent.

- It is common for the taking parent to successfully preclude the left-behind parent from having any contact with the child during the lengthy court proceedings, thereby enabling a psychologist to subsequently declare that there would be a “grave risk” of harm to the child if the child were sent back to the former residence, especially if the taking parent were not to accompany the child. 

The cases heard by the ECHR concerning Hungary's failure to comply with the Hague Abduction Convention include the following:


  1. Tonello v. Hungary (Application no. 46524/14)

In this case, the child was wrongfully retained in Hungary in 2011 away from her habitual residence in Italy. In 2012, the Hungarian courts ordered that the child must be returned to Italy. That order was never enforced. Although arrest warrants were ultimately issued against the mother, and for reasons that are difficult to understand, the Prosecution Office in Hungary dismissed the criminal charges as “unsubstantiated” and the mother's name was deleted from a list of people who were wanted under an arrest warrant. A host of subsequent proceedings ensued, all without success. In 2018, the ECHR ruled that Hungary had violated Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which provides that, “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life.”


  1. Cavani v. Hungary (Application no. 5493/13),

In Cavani v. Hungary, the children's mother abducted the children from Italy to Hungary in 2005. The Pest Central District Court found that the mother was keeping the children in Hungary illegally in violation of Article 3 of the Convention but refused to order their return to Italy because at their young age the children needed to be cared for by their mother. That ruling was in absolute violation of the Convention since “best interests” must not be considered in a Hague case. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the children should be returned to Italy. However, the Hungarian authorities never enforced that order despite the ongoing efforts of the father, recounted at length in the European Court's ruling, throughout the next several years. The Hungarian authorities repeatedly claimed that they could not find the children. During all of this time the father never saw the children. Seven years after the abduction the children were found, but only because their school principal in Budakeszi, Hungary brought a court action in Hungary in which he stated that the children were in danger in their mother's custody and asked that they be placed in state protection. By this time the children could no longer speak Italian and were totally estranged from their father.

The ECHR ruled in 2014 that: “the Hungarian authorities failed to take adequate measures to facilitate the reunification of the applicants and [it] considers that the applicants must have suffered anguish and distress as a result of the forced separation and the perspective of the father and daughters never seeing each other again.” This was a clear violation of Article 8. However, the only award that it was empowered to make was a financial award to the father.


  1. Shaw v. Hungary(Case No. 6457/09)

In Shaw v. Hungary, the ECHR ruled that Hungary had violated its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to diligently process a Hague case brought by an Irish father to secure the return of his child from Hungary to France, where they lived, following the parents' divorce. The family lived in France. In 2007 the mother took the child to her native Hungary for what was supposed to be a Christmas vacation, but never returned the child. The father promptly brought a Hague case in Hungary and also obtained a custody order from the French courts but he never saw his daughter again.

A court in Pest, Hungary ordered the child's return and two appeal courts upheld the return order. The local bailiff twice unsuccessfully called on the mother to comply voluntarily with the court's order. Meanwhile, a French court issued a European arrest warrant for the mother for the offence of change of custody of a minor. She was then arrested in Hungary but was promptly released by the Budapest regional court on the ground that similar proceedings were pending before a Hungarian court. The mother then disappeared with the child and the Hungarian officials thereafter continuously claimed that they could not find her or the child.

Having exhausted his remedies in Hungary the father ultimately brought suit against the State of Hungary in the European Court of Human Rights. He complained that Hungary had violated his rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, upholding private and family life, by failing to take timely and adequate measures for him to be reunited with his daughter. The Hungarian government claimed that it had done everything possible to try to secure the child's return to France, but that the mother had absconded with the child which had temporarily prevented the authorities from taking any further measures.

Finding that the Hungarian state had violated the father's rights to family life, the ECHR ordered the payment of €20,000 for the anguish and distress he had suffered as a result of the insufficient measures taken by the Hungarian authorities and awarded €12,000 for legal and related expenses. However, the Court had no power to locate the child or to return the child to the father.


  1. Prizzia v. Hungary (Case No. 20255/12), 

In Prizzia v. Hungary the ECHR ruled that Hungary had violated its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to honor and implement the rights of a left-behind American father to have contact with his abducted son living in Hungary.

The parents lived in Virginia with their son. The Hungarian mother took the child to Budapest for a Christmas visit in 2003 and then refused to return him. The father promptly commenced a case in Hungary under the Hague Convention and traveled to Hungary on many subsequent occasions for the ensuing litigation. He lost at first instance on the improper ground that the mother was Hungarian and that it was better that her child lived in Hungary. On appeal he won but the media in Hungary complained that American authorities were “bullying” the Hungarian authorities and the Supreme Court of Hungary changed its earlier ruling and refused to return the child on the ground that he should not be separated from his Hungarian half-brother.

The father then engaged in several years of intense litigation in Hungary to try to at least get access to his son.  A court in Budapest ultimately gave some limited access rights to him but those rights could not be enforced. Ultimately the father was able to see his son very occasionally but only in Hungary and he was never able to take his son for visits to the United States. The Supreme Court of Hungary eventually ordered that there should be summer visits to the United States but the authorities in Hungary failed entirely to allow those rights to be enforced.

When the father had exhausted his remedies in Hungary, he brought suit against Hungary in the European Court. That Court eventually ruled in 2013 – ten years after the child was abducted -- that Hungary had violated the Convention by failing to provide the father with effective rights of access to his son. Once again, the Court merely made a financial award to the left-behind parent for legal fees and for “having suffered anguish and distress as a result of the withering ties with his son and the insufficient measures taken by the Hungarian authorities.”

 

 

Argentina: 2021 State Department's Annual Report on International Child Abduction

The U.S. State Department has recently released their annual report on International Child Abduction. The Department of State leads the U.S. government’s efforts to prevent and resolve international parental child abductions, as part of the Department’s mission to advance the interests and safety of the American people.


The 2021 Annual Report on International Child Abduction illustrates the Department of State’s efforts to prevent and resolve international parental child abductions during 2020. Despite continued progress, during 2021 some countries demonstrated a pattern of noncompliance as defined in the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014. This Report cites eleven such countries.


ARGENTINA

Country Summary: The Convention has been in force between the United States and Argentina since 1991. In 2020, Argentina continued to demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance. Specifically, the Argentine judicial authorities failed to regularly implement and comply with the provisions of the Convention. As a result of this failure, 67 percent of requests for the return of abducted children under the Convention remained unresolved for more than 12 months. On average, these cases were unresolved for six years. Argentina was previously cited for demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance in the 2015-2020 Annual Reports.

Initial Inquiries: In 2020, the Department received one initial inquiry from a parent regarding a possible abduction to Argentina for which no completed application was submitted to the Department.

Significant Developments: Draft legislation designed to address Argentina’s judicial delays, introduced in the Argentine legislature in 2018, was not enacted in 2020. Serious delays persisted within the Argentine judiciary in 2020, contributing to a pattern of noncompliance. Additionally, in 2020, there was a significant changeover of Argentine Central Authority officials working with the U.S. Central Authority, leading to some delays in communication.

Central Authority: While the U.S. and Argentine Central Authorities have a cooperative relationship, delays in communication about actions to address patterns of noncompliance are an area of concern. 

Location: The competent authorities took appropriate steps to locate a child after a Convention application was filed. It took eight days to locate this child. Judicial Authorities: There were serious delays by the Argentine judicial authorities in deciding Convention cases. As a result of these delays, cases may be pending with the judiciary for over one year, contributing to a pattern of noncompliance.

Enforcement: In one case pending for more than 11 years, Argentina has not enforced a return order for the last several years. Additionally, Argentina’s legal system allows multiple appeals both on the merits of the decision and on the manner in which the decisions are enforced, thereby creating excessive delays which contribute to a pattern of noncompliance.

Access: In 2020, the U.S. Central Authority had one open access case under the Convention in Argentina. This case was opened in 2018. This case has been filed with the Argentine Central Authority. No new cases were filed in 2020. By December 31, 2020, this case remained open. This case has been pending with the Argentine authorities for more than 12 months.

Department Recommendations: The Department will continue intense engagement with Argentine authorities to address issues of concern.


Tuesday, April 06, 2021

DIVORCE LAW IN KOREA

 

Grounds For Divorce in Korea

A divorce may be obtained in Korea based on the mutual consent of the spouses. Art. 834, Korean Civil Act. Both spouses need to agree and appear in court in Korea.


Alternatively, the grounds for a judicial divorce in Korea (Art. 840) are:

  1. An unchaste act (adultery);
  2. Malicious desertion;
  3. Extreme maltreatment by the other spouse or by his/her lineal ascendants;
  4. Extreme maltreatment of one spouse's lineal ascendant by the other spouse;
  5. When the death or life of the spouse has been unknown for three years; or
  6. Any other serious reason for which it is difficult to continue the marriage.

There is no provision for a no-fault divorce (except for a divorce by agreement between the parties).

The Korean judicial divorce process is a fault-based contest between a wrongdoer and the wronged. The courts reason that a guiltless spouse should not be forced into an unwanted divorce. Korean legal scholars supporting the fault-based system generally cite the following reasons: Granting a divorce to the party at fault goes against Confucian morality (doei) and may encourage the husband to arbitrarily abandon his wife, as was the practice in the past. Moreover, by forcing a couple to stay in marriage, it is believed that a wife will be able to continue to use the common property and receive support.

The standards that govern divorce and child custody in Korea are extremely subjective and the judges are vested with great discretion. The standards are very flexible. In the Korean system, the judge is intended to be a parent to the public, who is benevolent, lenient, and wise.

Financial Issues in Korean Divorce Law

The Korean Civil Act provides that, unless there is an agreement concerning the division of property (but see below on this), the Family Court shall "determine the amount and method of division, considering the amount of property acquired by cooperation of both parties and other circumstances." Korea Civil Code, Art. 839-2(2).

The courts consider such factors as the parties' ages, occupations, the reason why they came to a divorce, and their contribution to the property in deciding the proportion. The property that can be divided is property that was acquired during marriage through the cooperation of both spouses. Property that was acquired solely through the individual effort of one spouse even during the marriage is treated as the individual property of that party. Therefore, the court has a very broad discretion to determine what property is divisible, based on the extent to which the parties "cooperated" in the creation of any particular asset.

Of critical importance is the language in the Act to the effect that the Family Court should determine the amount and method of division "considering the amount of property acquired by cooperation of both parties and other circumstances." Korea Civil Act, Art. 839-2(2).

Article 830 defines "particular property" (sometimes translated as “peculiar” property) as property that a spouse owned before marriage or property acquired during marriage but is under the name of only one spouse. The meaning of "particular property" in terms of divisible property under Article 839-2 is different from the meaning under Article 830. Property accumulated during marriage that is under only one spouse's name is nonetheless divisible if it resulted from cooperation of the married couple.

The Supreme Court of Korea has affirmed lower court rulings that have insisted that the household labor of one spouse must be taken into account when applying this rule. Nonetheless, the Korean courts have historically undervalued the contribution of spouses who provide housework by giving them less property in the division of acquired marital property. Retirement allowances are divisible only if at the time of the divorce they have been received or the date of the retirement and the amount has been declared.

In addition, there is no spousal maintenance in Korea and the courts have the power to adjust the property division in favor of the economically disadvantaged party. For this reason, in some cases a nonworking spouse has received more than half of the parties' assets. Indeed, Korean counsel report that in practice the typical rule is that upon a divorce the wife is invariably entitled to receive one-half of all of the parties' assets, both pre-marital and post-marital.

Choice of Law in Korean Divorce Law

Korean courts apply the law of the parties' common nationality to their divorce and to matters arising from the divorce. If there is no common nationality, they will apply the law of a common habitual residence or otherwise the law of the place that is most closely connected to both spouses. Article 840. Korean Civil Act.

However, if one of the spouses is a Korean national whose habitual residence is in Korea the court must apply Korean law. Korea, Private International Act, Art. 39.

If the parties have chosen a foreign law to govern their marital property, the choice might be respected if the agreement complies with execution requirements and if the law that is chosen is that of either spouse's nationality or habitual residence (or in the case of real property is the law of the location of the property). Korea, Private International Act, Art. 38. However, this issue is extremely uncertain (see below).

Issues concerning the legal relations between parents and children are governed by the law of the parents' common nationality or otherwise by the law of the child's habitual residence. Korea, Private International Act, Art. 45.

Prenuptial Agreements in Korea

The Korean Civil Code expressly authorizes “marital agreements” concerning the division of property between marrying spouses, but these are not necessarily equivalent to prenuptial agreements.  agreements.

Article 829 of the Civil Act provides that, “(1) If husband and wife have not, prior to the formation of marriage, entered into a contract which provides otherwise with respect to their property, their property relation shall be governed by the provision of each Article of this Sub-Section.”

The meaning of this provision is uncertain. There are two opinions on this issue in Korea:

The first opinion is that marital agreements should be recognized upon a divorce under the principle of freedom of contract. This view is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court of Korea issued in 2000, in which the Court held that, “The consultation on the division of property shall refer to the consultation that is held between the parties who have already completed a divorce or the parties who have not yet been divorced with regard to the division of property acquired by the cooperation of both parties during the marriage. In cases where a party who has not yet been divorced makes a consultation on the division of property on the premise that the divorce shall be held, if the party subsequently divorced as determined, the consultation on the division of property shall take effect. (Supreme Court, 24 October 2000, 99 Da33458).

The second opinion, which is totally contradictory, is that a marital agreement should not include provisions concerning the division of assets upon a divorce and that any such provisions would be invalid. This is because a marital property contract is intended to govern the spouses’ relationship during their marriage only and that an agreement that deprives a party of the protection provided by the laws governing financial rights upon a divorce would violate Korean public policy.

Korean Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees

Article 217 of the Korean Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

A final foreign judgment shall be valid and enforceable only if it satisfies the following conditions:

(1)      A final and conclusive judgment rendered by a foreign court or a judgment acknowledged to have the same force (hereinafter referred to as "final judgment, etc.") shall be recognized, if all of the following requirements are met:

  1. That the international jurisdiction of such foreign court is recognized under the principle of international jurisdiction pursuant to the statutes or treaties of the Republic of Korea;
  2. That a defeated defendant is served, by a lawful method, a written complaint or document corresponding thereto, and notification of date or written order allowing him or her sufficient time to defend (excluding cases of service by public notice or similar), or that he or she responds to the lawsuit even without having been served such documents;
  3. That the approval of such final judgment, etc. does not undermine sound morals or other social order of the Republic of Korea in light of the contents of such final judgment, etc. and judicial procedures;
  4. That mutual guarantee exists, or the requirements for recognition of final judgment, etc. in the Republic of Korea and the foreign country to which the foreign country court belongs are not far off balance and have no actual difference between each other in important points.

The effect is to provide several distinct requirements that must be satisfied if a foreign judgment is to be enforced in Korea:

(a) The requirement of finality and conclusiveness

Interim awards are not the subject of enforcement proceedings in Korea. Foreign temporary dispositions are not recognizable because of their nature as provisional remedies.

A foreign judgment will be considered a final judgment only if there exists no possibility of a future appeal. The party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment must prove either that an appeal is not possible or that the time for an appeal has passed. California counsel should advise as to whether or not these conditions have been fulfilled.

An order for pre-judgment attachment and an order for pre-judgment injunction are examples of non-final judgments. Similarly, even if a foreign judgment which is permitted provisional enforcement pending an appeal is enforceable in the concerned jurisdiction, it cannot be a subject of recognition in Korea so long as it is not final.

(b) The issue of the location of the subject-matter

The in personam and in rem concepts are alien to Korean jurisprudence. Generally, a foreign judgment in rem would be recognized and/ or enforced in Korea when the judgment concerns immovable or movable property that was within the jurisdiction of the foreign court at the time of the proceeding.

(c) The jurisdiction of the foreign court

It is clear that a Korean court will not enforce a judgment of a foreign court concerning a dispute that is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Korea or a third country. For example, in an action concerning rights in Korean real estate Korean courts have exclusive jurisdiction. This will apply to movables located in Korea.

(d) Public policy

Public policy or good morals in Section 217 are judged by Korean standards. The requirement has a broad meaning, which may range from substantive contents of the foreign judgment to procedural fundamentals. The reasons leading to the conclusion as well as the conclusion of the foreign judgment itself should be examined in deciding whether or not the content of the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy or good morals.

A foreign judgment, the substance of which is not compatible with fundamental principles of Korean law, cannot be recognized in Korea. In determining compatibility with public policy, the factual basis of a judgment, as well as its text, must be taken into consideration. Thus, even a monetary judgment may be held in violation of Korean public policy if the factual basis of such judgment is so illegal or repugnant that the assistance of the Korean courts in implementing the judgment is deemed unacceptable in light of Korean legal philosophy. For example, a judgment ordering the defendant to deliver contraband goods, or a judgment confirming the legality of a concubine is not recognizable in Korea.

(e) Reciprocity

It is not necessary that a Korean judgment has been recognized in practice if it is predictable that a Korean judgment will be recognized in light of statutes and legal theories in the foreign country. The conditions of recognition do not have to be identical in Korea and the foreign country. A substantial similarity in important points of the respective requirements should be considered sufficient. The term reciprocity in Section 203 means that the particular foreign country does not inquire into the merits of a Korean judgment by reason of a treaty or its domestic law, and that such foreign country would recognize the validity of a Korean judgment under a standard similar to or more lenient than that of Article 203. Reciprocity means that as the Korean courts recognize judgments of foreign courts, so should the foreign courts recognize Korean judgments. Reciprocity purports to prevent inequitable treatment of Korean judgments by foreign courts.